Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB006MaRDI QIDQ5022703zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alessandro Dovis, Rishabh Kirpalani

Publication date 19 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w26451.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

policy rulesreputationtime inconsistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Regulation by reputation
• Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
• Reputation in dynamic games

Cited in

(9)

• Regulation by reputation
• Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Incentives for prosocial behavior under reputation persistence and policy lags
• A theory of international unions with exits
• Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
• Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
• Debt ceilings with fiscal intransparency and imperfect electoral accountability
• Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans

This page was built for publication: Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5022703)