SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MONETARY VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING

DOI10.1017/S1365100506050255MaRDI QIDQ3426139zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn

Publication date 8 March 2007

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100506050255

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentsignalinginflation targetingmonetary targetingcentral banks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(3)

• The signaling effect of raising inflation
• Inflation targeting with imperfect information
• Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy

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