STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
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Recommendations
- Environmental models and partial cooperative games
- Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments
- Conditions for sustainable cooperation
- Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility
- On the stability of cooperation structures
- Stable cooperation in stochastic games
Cites work
- A differential game of industrial pollution management
- Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
- Environmental Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49955 (Why is no real title available?)
- TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
Cited in
(16)- Nothing better to do? Environment quality and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice
- Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility
- A unified cooperative model for environmental costs in supply chains: the Shapley value for the linear case
- Modeling coopetition
- Balanced environmental games
- Stable Shapley value in cooperative game of territorial environmental production
- Game theoretic approach for fertilizer application: looking for the propensity to cooperate
- The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework
- Collaborative environmental management: a review of the literature
- Environmental stochasticity, Cournot competition and the prisoner's dilemma
- Full cooperation applied to environmental improvements
- Environmental models and partial cooperative games
- Coalitional solution in a game theoretic model of territorial environmental production
- Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
- Towards an understanding of tradeoffs between regional wealth, tightness of a common environmental constraint and the sharing rules
- Dynamic models of competition and cooperation in Cournot oligopoly taking into account the environmental impact
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