Security of the blockchain against long delay attack
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Cites work
- Analysis of the Blockchain Protocol in Asynchronous Networks
- But why does it work? A rational protocol design treatment of bitcoin
- Concentration of Measure for the Analysis of Randomized Algorithms
- FruitChains: a fair blockchain
- Majority is not enough: bitcoin mining is vulnerable
- Ouroboros Praos: an adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain
- Ouroboros: a provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol
- Secure high-rate transaction processing in bitcoin
- The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications
- The Bitcoin backbone protocol with chains of variable difficulty
- The sleepy model of consensus
- Thunderella: blockchains with optimistic instant confirmation
Cited in
(9)- Short paper: On the claims of weak block synchronization in Bitcoin
- Three attacks on proof-of-stake ethereum
- Ouroboros Praos: an adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain
- The Bitcoin backbone protocol with chains of variable difficulty
- Practical settlement bounds for longest-chain consensus
- BLOCKCHAIN DOUBLE-SPEND ATTACK DURATION
- Formalizing delayed adaptive corruptions and the security of flooding networks
- Probability of double spend attack for network with non-zero time delay
- The impact of network delay on Nakamoto consensus mechanism
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