Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition

DOI10.3982/TE5338MaRDI QIDQ6922332zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David R. Agrawal, A. Bagh, Mohammed Mardan

Publication date 1 October 2025

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5338

zbMATH Keywords

fiscal competitioninverse elasticityoptimal taxationRamsey rulesales taxspatial price competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model
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• The supermodularity of the tax competition game

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