Separating selective opening security from standard security, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation
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Cites work
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Cryptographic assumptions: a position paper
- Cryptographic hashing from strong one-way functions (or: one-way product functions and their applications)
- Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) LWE
- Encoding and error-correction procedures for the Bose-Chaudhuri codes
- Fiat-Shamir and correlation intractability from strong KDM-secure encryption
- Fiat-Shamir: from practice to theory
- Fiat–Shamir via list-recoverable codes (or: parallel repetition of GMW is not zero-knowledge)
- From obfuscation to the security of Fiat-Shamir for proofs
- Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
- How to use indistinguishability obfuscation: deniable encryption, and more
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 176565 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256784 (Why is no real title available?)
- Indistinguishability obfuscation from LPN over \(\mathbb{F}_p\), DLIN, and PRGs in \(NC^0\)
- Indistinguishability obfuscation from well-founded assumptions
- Limits of extractability assumptions with distributional auxiliary input
- Magic functions
- New negative results on differing-inputs obfuscation
- Non-interactive batch arguments for NP from standard assumptions
- Noninteractive zero knowledge for NP from (Plain) Learning With Errors
- On the implausibility of differing-inputs obfuscation and extractable witness encryption with auxiliary input
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Probabilistic encryption
- Public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation and its applications
- Random-oracle uninstantiability from indistinguishability obfuscation
- Separations in circular security for arbitrary length key cycles
- Shift-register synthesis and BCH decoding
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
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