Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- On selective-opening attacks against encryption schemes
- Selective Opening Security for Receivers
Cited in
(41)- Robust encryption
- Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers
- TARDIS: a foundation of time-lock puzzles in UC
- On selective-opening security of deterministic primitives
- Targeted lossy functions and applications
- On the power of rewinding simulators in functional encryption
- Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting
- Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting
- Non-malleability under selective opening attacks: implication and separation
- Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions
- Selective Opening Security for Receivers
- On definitions of selective opening security
- On selective-opening attacks against encryption schemes
- Selective opening security from simulatable data encapsulation
- Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures
- Constructions secure against receiver selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks
- (Nearly) round-optimal black-box constructions of commitments secure against selective opening attacks
- Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Public-key encryption with simulation-based selective-opening security and compact ciphertexts
- Possibility and impossibility results for selective decommitments
- Revisiting lower and upper bounds for selective decommitments
- Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
- Simulation-based receiver selective opening CCA secure PKE from standard computational assumptions
- Let attackers program ideal models: modularity and composability for adaptive compromise
- Compact and tightly selective-opening secure public-key encryption schemes
- Anonymous public key encryption under corruptions
- Simulation-based bi-selective opening security for public key encryption
- Predicate encryption with selective-opening security for receivers: formal definition, generic construction, and concrete instantiations for several primitives
- Symmetric and dual PRFs from standard assumptions: a generic validation of a prevailing assumption
- Selective opening security in the quantum random oracle model, revisited
- SoK: public key encryption with openings
- Compact selective opening security from LWE
- Count corruptions, not users: improved tightness for signatures, encryption and authenticated key exchange
- Fully selective opening secure IBE from LWE
- Generic constructions of compact and tightly selective-opening secure public-key encryption schemes
- Hierarchical identity-based encryption with receiver selective opening security in the multi-challenge setting
- Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited
- Insight of the protection for data security under selective opening attacks
- SO-CCA secure PKE from pairing based all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions
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