On selective-opening attacks against encryption schemes
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Public-key encryption with selective opening security from general assumptions
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- Selective Opening Security for Receivers
- On definitions of selective opening security
Cited in
(19)- On selective-opening security of deterministic primitives
- Cryptographic reverse firewalls for interactive proof systems
- Public-key encryption with selective opening security from general assumptions
- Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting
- Non-malleability under selective opening attacks: implication and separation
- Improved OR-composition of sigma-protocols
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- On definitions of selective opening security
- Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures
- Constructions secure against receiver selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks
- Lossy encryption: Constructions from general assumptions and efficient selective opening chosen ciphertext security
- Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
- Cryptographic reverse firewalls for interactive proof systems
- Universally composable non-interactive zero-knowledge from sigma protocols via a new straight-line compiler
- Insight of the protection for data security under selective opening attacks
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