Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures
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Recommendations
- On the selective opening security of practical public-key encryption schemes
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Public-key encryption with selective opening security from general assumptions
- On selective-opening attacks against encryption schemes
- The cryptographic power of random selection
- Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks
Cites work
- Deterministic and Efficiently Searchable Encryption
- Deterministic Encryption: Definitional Equivalences and Constructions without Random Oracles
- Hedged public-key encryption: how to protect against bad randomness
- How secure is deterministic encryption?
- How to Encrypt with a Malicious Random Number Generator
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1341866 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1942416 (Why is no real title available?)
- Instantiability of RSA-OAEP under chosen-plaintext attack
- Instantiating random oracles via UCEs
- Leftover Hash Lemma, Revisited
- Lossy trapdoor functions and their applications
- Nonce-based cryptography: retaining security when randomness fails
- On definitions of selective opening security
- On the lossiness of the Rabin trapdoor function
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation and its applications
- Resettable public-key encryption: how to encrypt on a virtual machine
- Resisting randomness subversion: fast deterministic and hedged public-key encryption in the standard model
- Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
Cited in
(14)- Hedged nonce-based public-key encryption: adaptive security under randomness failures
- Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers
- On selective-opening security of deterministic primitives
- Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions
- Selective Opening Security for Receivers
- Nonce-based cryptography: retaining security when randomness fails
- Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Hedged public-key encryption: how to protect against bad randomness
- Toward RSA-OAEP without random oracles
- Predicate encryption with selective-opening security for receivers: formal definition, generic construction, and concrete instantiations for several primitives
- Hierarchical identity-based encryption with receiver selective opening security in the multi-challenge setting
- Insight of the protection for data security under selective opening attacks
- SO-CCA secure PKE from pairing based all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions
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