Nonce-based cryptography: retaining security when randomness fails

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_28MaRDI QIDQ2820505zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Bellare, Björn Tackmann

Publication date 9 September 2016

Published in Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_28

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(10)

• Hedged nonce-based public-key encryption: adaptive security under randomness failures
• Security of hedged Fiat-Shamir signatures under fault attacks
• Efficient schemes for committing authenticated encryption
• Nonces are noticed: AEAD revisited
• Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness
• Selective-Opening Security in the Presence of Randomness Failures
• Nonce-Based Key Agreement Protocol Against Bad Randomness
• Fast Software Encryption
• Hardening signature schemes via derive-then-derandomize: stronger security proofs for EdDSA
• The security of ML-DSA against fault-injection attacks

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