Non-malleability under selective opening attacks: implication and separation

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_5MaRDI QIDQ2794495zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhengan Huang, Shengli Liu, Xianping Mao, Kefei Chen

Publication date 10 March 2016

Published in Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_5

zbMATH Keywords

non-malleabilitypublic-key encryptionselective opening attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Selective Opening Security for Receivers
• On definitions of selective opening security
• On selective-opening attacks against encryption schemes
• Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
• Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results

Cites work

• All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions
• Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
• Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 176565 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1302835 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1302836 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1418315 (Why is no real title available?)
• Lossy encryption: Constructions from general assumptions and efficient selective opening chosen ciphertext security
• Nonmalleable Cryptography
• On definitions of selective opening security
• Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
• Probabilistic encryption
• Relations Among Notions of Non-malleability for Encryption
• Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited
• Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
• Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results

Cited in

(6)

• Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers
• Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting
• Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions
• Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
• SoK: public key encryption with openings
• Insight of the protection for data security under selective opening attacks

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