Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_13MaRDI QIDQ4614068zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, Sukolsak Sakshuwong

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.00771

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargainingsequential deliberationsocial choicesocial costspace of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative. We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded.

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Cited in

(10)

• Sequential decisions with several agents
• Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
• Iterative deliberation via metric aggregation
• Iterative local voting for collective decision-making in continuous spaces
• Sequential decision aggregation with social pressure
• Aggregation over metric spaces: proposing and voting in elections, budgeting, and legislation
• A distributed social choice protocol for combinatorial domains
• On thoughtfulness and generosity in sequential decisions
• United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo
• Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

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