Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
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Cites work
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- Black and Farquharson on order-of-voting effects: An extension
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
Cited in
(11)- An efficient algorithm for voting sequences
- The r-majority vote action on 0-1 sequences
- Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto
- A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
- Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
- Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. II. Algorithms for constructing an optimal order of moves
- Estimating the winning chances of a solution suggested by the first player under conditions of voting by veto
- Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
- The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority voting with an agenda
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