Shared Preferences and State-Dependent Utilities

DOI10.1287/MNSC.37.12.1575MaRDI QIDQ3989139zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane

Publication date 28 June 1992

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/195f59a00f3d757b668b10b510129ae5df2e8258

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian compromise between two Bayesian agentsexpected utility theoryhorse lottery

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(6)

• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
• The impossibility of compromise: Some uniqueness properties of expected utility preferences
• A representation of partially ordered preferences
• State-Dependent Utility
• The effect of exchange rates on statistical decisions
• Bayesian group belief

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