Signaling vision: knowing when to quit

DOI10.1111/IERE.70066MaRDI QIDQ7317394zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Junichiro Ishida, Wing Suen

Publication date 21 August 2026

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/IERE.70066

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• Leadership, coordination, and corporate culture
• Market signaling with grades
• Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types
• Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences

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