Acyclic choice and group veto (Q1064268)

The Arrow Impossibility Theorem assumes transitivity. Acyclicity is a more appropriate rationality condition for collective decision procedures. Many impossibility theorems for acyclic choice need to assume that there are more alternatives than individuals. In this paper we show that by considering circumstances under which groups (or coalitions) have veto it is possible to prove impossibility theorems without making such an assumption. Our results extend recent theorems by \textit{J. H. Blau} and \textit{R. Deb} [Econometrica 45, 871-879 (1977; Zbl 0362.90002)] and \textit{D. H. Blair} and \textit{R. A. Pollak} [ibid. 50, 931-943 (1982; Zbl 0483.90009)].