Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. (Q1421898)

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Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games.
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    Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. (English)
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    3 February 2004
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    Let \(G[c,f]\) be a nonatomic congestion game, where \(c\) denotes cost functions and \(f\) denotes a fixed-utility assignment. The paper shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimum of \(G[c,f]\), and gives a sufficient conditions for the equilibrium and the optimum to coincide. In the event that costs are logarithmic, the equilibrium payoff distribution of \(G[c,f]\) coincides with the Harsanyi value of the corresponding transferable utility game -- a remarkable result.
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    congestion game
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    Aumann-Shapley value
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    Harsanyi value
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    potential
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