Entity usage

This page lists pages that use the given entity (e.g. Q42). The list is sorted by descending page ID, so that newer pages are listed first.

Showing below up to 50 results in range #1 to #50.

Plenum Theory: Label: en
How to be a Truthmaker Maximalist: Label: en
Mathematics and Modality: Label: en
Philosophical Method and The Theory of Predication and Identity: Label: en
Not Every Object of Thought has Being: A Paradox in Naive Predication Theory: Label: en
Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox: Label: en
Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties, Meinong, and Leibniz: Label: en
The Plight of the Platonist: Label: en
Mathematics, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge: Label: en
A Russellian Approach to Truth: Label: en
Predication and Singular Terms: Label: en
Ontology and Mathematical Truth: Label: en
A Theory of Aggregates: Label: en
A Defense of Conventionalism: Label: en
When Rational Disagreement is Impossible: Label: en
Possible Worlds: Label: en
The Intrinsic Value in Disjunctive States of Affairs: Label: en
Cresswell's Colleague TLM: Label: en
Hamblin on Time: Label: en
Second-Order Theories of Predication: Old and New Foundations: Label: en
A Note on Interpreting Theories: Label: en
Inference and the Logical "Ought": Label: en
Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Part II): Label: en
The Geometry of Visibles: Label: en
Sets and Classes: Label: en
Possible Individuals, Trans-World Identity, and Quantified Modal Logic: Label: en
Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Part I): Label: en
Suppositio and Quantification in Ockham: Label: en
The Semantics of First Degree Entailment: Label: en
Absolute Space and the Metaphysics of Theories: Label: en
Some Thoughts on the JK‐Rule¹: Label: en
The Story About Propositions: Label: en
On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals: Label: en
The Status of our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe¹: Label: en
Why Does Time Pass?: Label: en
General Terms and Relational Modality*: Label: en
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge: Label: en
Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts¹: Label: en
What Tipper is Ready for: A Semantics for Incomplete Predicates: Label: en
Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options: Label: en
Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account: Label: en
Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?: Label: en
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics: Label: en
The Composition of Thoughts: Label: en
Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge: Label: en
Defending Conditional Excluded Middle: Label: en
Zif Would Have Been If: A Suppositional View of Counterfactuals: Label: en
Dimensional Explanations: Label: en
Normative Conflicts and The Logic of ‘Ought’: Label: en
New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives, Consistency, and Quantifiers*: Label: en