Pages that link to "Item:Q1036602"
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The following pages link to Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602):
Displayed 18 items.
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds (Q406428) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (Q682480) (← links)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts (Q766250) (← links)
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257) (← links)
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility (Q1651280) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis (Q1757595) (← links)
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers (Q2416650) (← links)
- On the number of employed in the matching model (Q2425191) (← links)