The following pages link to Refining cheap-talk equilibria (Q1181665):
Displaying 25 items.
- Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games (Q508394) (← links)
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets (Q523475) (← links)
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria (Q532686) (← links)
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (Q533083) (← links)
- Informal communication (Q707291) (← links)
- Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests (Q907901) (← links)
- A ``super'' folk theorem for dynastic repeated games (Q957854) (← links)
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information (Q1021596) (← links)
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games (Q1371139) (← links)
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions (Q2051504) (← links)
- Language and coordination games (Q2059053) (← links)
- Self-rejecting mechanisms (Q2178032) (← links)
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes (Q2280048) (← links)
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games (Q2347765) (← links)
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication (Q2391973) (← links)
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights (Q2442848) (← links)
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria (Q2496231) (← links)
- Persuasion with communication costs (Q2516228) (← links)
- Good manners: signaling social preferences (Q2629325) (← links)
- Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information (Q2636779) (← links)
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games (Q2685842) (← links)
- RANDOM AUTHORITY (Q2980206) (← links)
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games (Q4625074) (← links)
- Signaling Games (Q5149736) (← links)
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest (Q5953417) (← links)
