Pages that link to "Item:Q1190252"

The following pages link to A dominant strategy double auction (Q1190252):

Displaying 36 items.

• Groves mechanisms and communication externalities (Q283181) (← links)
• Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders (Q683517) (← links)
• Multibidding game under uncertainty (Q707707) (← links)
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches (Q869603) (← links)
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget (Q894621) (← links)
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects (Q1001816) (← links)
• A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms (Q1015002) (← links)
• The modified Vickrey double auction (Q1347829) (← links)
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition (Q1642157) (← links)
• A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing (Q1669102) (← links)
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (Q1757552) (← links)
• Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
• Optimal market thickness (Q2123167) (← links)
• Optimal mechanism for land acquisition (Q2128948) (← links)
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (Q2173111) (← links)
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism (Q2177999) (← links)
• Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits (Q2196104) (← links)
• Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets (Q2238720) (← links)
• Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market (Q2389294) (← links)
• Modularity and greed in double auctions (Q2411517) (← links)
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Q2482637) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions for electronic business (Q2571439) (← links)
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (Q2667262) (← links)
• Cost sharing in two-sided markets (Q2670930) (← links)
• SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism (Q2819464) (← links)
• Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors (Q2819465) (← links)
• Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms (Q3460787) (← links)
• Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets (Q5076699) (← links)
• Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best (Q5106370) (← links)
• Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply (Q5937321) (← links)
• A parametrization of the auction design space (Q5938628) (← links)
• Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets (Q6067051) (← links)
• Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games (Q6096591) (← links)
• Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for ridesharing (Q6109306) (← links)
• Properties of bundle valuations in carrier collaboration (Q6558647) (← links)
• On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values (Q6581890) (← links)