Pages that link to "Item:Q1300686"
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The following pages link to A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (Q1300686):
Displaying 45 items.
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights (Q277315) (← links)
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently (Q414371) (← links)
- Asymmetric partnerships (Q433189) (← links)
- Seller competition by mechanism design (Q453209) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- When queueing is better than push and shove (Q532746) (← links)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892) (← links)
- Second best efficiency and the English auction (Q645656) (← links)
- Multibidding game under uncertainty (Q707707) (← links)
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms (Q825192) (← links)
- Internet auctions with many traders (Q854942) (← links)
- Universal possibility and impossibility results (Q863268) (← links)
- On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism (Q894630) (← links)
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
- The modified Vickrey double auction (Q1347829) (← links)
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. (Q1421886) (← links)
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation (Q1622381) (← links)
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition (Q1642157) (← links)
- Bargaining mechanisms for one-way games (Q1651808) (← links)
- Mechanism design for land acquisition (Q1677251) (← links)
- Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment (Q1751915) (← links)
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (Q1757552) (← links)
- Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach (Q1941986) (← links)
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms (Q2058863) (← links)
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability (Q2098976) (← links)
- Optimal market thickness (Q2123167) (← links)
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments (Q2164330) (← links)
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (Q2173111) (← links)
- A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism (Q2177999) (← links)
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle (Q2268126) (← links)
- The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap (Q2338660) (← links)
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences (Q2358563) (← links)
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control (Q2384439) (← links)
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments (Q2425156) (← links)
- Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions (Q2427875) (← links)
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships (Q2453426) (← links)
- The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Q2482637) (← links)
- Public goods with congestion (Q2496791) (← links)
- Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival (Q2685832) (← links)
- When Walras meets Vickrey (Q6059566) (← links)
- Trade of a common value good (Q6086121) (← links)
- Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements (Q6093777) (← links)
- Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games (Q6096591) (← links)
