Pages that link to "Item:Q1413220"

The following pages link to Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. (Q1413220):

Displaying 12 items.

• Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty (Q324340) (← links)
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies (Q632974) (← links)
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity (Q898665) (← links)
• The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. (Q1395000) (← links)
• Core convergence with asymmetric information (Q1779839) (← links)
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. (Q1867762) (← links)
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
• Equilibria and incentives in private information economies (Q2397644) (← links)
• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments (Q2432489) (← links)
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies (Q2460834) (← links)
• Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies (Q5110636) (← links)
• Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete (Q5316204) (← links)