Pages that link to "Item:Q1566906"
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The following pages link to Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (Q1566906):
Displayed 17 items.
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
- Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level (Q705941) (← links)
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (Q708883) (← links)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667) (← links)
- Coalition formation games with separable preferences. (Q1810716) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts (Q2343802) (← links)
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems (Q2373788) (← links)
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (Q2496782) (← links)
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup> (Q4531544) (← links)