Pages that link to "Item:Q1566906"

The following pages link to Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings (Q1566906):

Displaying 21 items.

• The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level (Q705941) (← links)
• Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (Q708883) (← links)
• Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667) (← links)
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences. (Q1810716) (← links)
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (Q2078071) (← links)
• Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts (Q2343802) (← links)
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems (Q2373788) (← links)
• On the contracts between doctors and rural hospitals (Q2417187) (← links)
• On the number of employed in the matching model (Q2425191) (← links)
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (Q2496782) (← links)
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (Q2675448) (← links)
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗ (Q4531544) (← links)