The following pages link to Michael Peters (Q166096):
Displaying 25 items.
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism (Q645642) (← links)
- Internet auctions with many traders (Q854942) (← links)
- Reciprocal contracting (Q896940) (← links)
- An ascending double auction (Q946361) (← links)
- Research and development with publicly observable outcomes (Q1087460) (← links)
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms (Q1125569) (← links)
- On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions (Q1339032) (← links)
- Incentive-consistent matching processes for problems with ex ante pricing (Q1339741) (← links)
- Sequential selling mechanisms (Q1341487) (← links)
- Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market (Q1342411) (← links)
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices (Q1367768) (← links)
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency. (Q1400986) (← links)
- Labour contracts in a stock market economy (Q1839185) (← links)
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms (Q2447055) (← links)
- The pre-marital investment game (Q2469843) (← links)
- Surplus Extraction and Competition (Q2763326) (← links)
- Definable and Contractible Contracts (Q2859058) (← links)
- Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search (Q3587006) (← links)
- Immobility, Rationing and Price Competition (Q3691364) (← links)
- Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility (Q3698598) (← links)
- Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts (Q4033905) (← links)
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States (Q4271330) (← links)
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions (Q4368671) (← links)
- On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts (Q4368679) (← links)
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search. (Q5927613) (← links)
