The following pages link to The package assignment model. (Q1867556):
Displayed 50 items.
- Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors (Q331786) (← links)
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (Q361803) (← links)
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (Q423778) (← links)
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium (Q503042) (← links)
- First price package auction with many traders (Q516057) (← links)
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (Q532751) (← links)
- On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling (Q550202) (← links)
- Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (Q550207) (← links)
- Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core (Q627118) (← links)
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (Q682485) (← links)
- Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities (Q707126) (← links)
- Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions (Q812381) (← links)
- Trading networks with price-setting agents (Q834853) (← links)
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects (Q869853) (← links)
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (Q869869) (← links)
- A survey on assignment markets (Q908179) (← links)
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions (Q972880) (← links)
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions (Q976430) (← links)
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (Q1002323) (← links)
- A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms (Q1015002) (← links)
- Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions (Q1042137) (← links)
- Pricing combinatorial auctions. (Q1420433) (← links)
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations (Q1622372) (← links)
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity (Q1633663) (← links)
- A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes (Q1651618) (← links)
- Dual bounds of a service level assignment problem with applications to efficient pricing (Q1754037) (← links)
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade (Q1757552) (← links)
- Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges (Q1782326) (← links)
- The package assignment model. (Q1867556) (← links)
- The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria (Q1935950) (← links)
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes (Q1985725) (← links)
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction (Q2098923) (← links)
- Exploiting complete linear descriptions for decentralized power market problems with integralities (Q2155382) (← links)
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources (Q2231384) (← links)
- A trading mechanism contingent on several indices (Q2275808) (← links)
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546) (← links)
- Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study (Q2276557) (← links)
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions (Q2436300) (← links)
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (Q2455666) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions (Q2480257) (← links)
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem (Q2486413) (← links)
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (Q2496786) (← links)
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions (Q2506307) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (Q2506310) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business (Q2571439) (← links)
- Allocation of advertising space by a web service provider using combinatorial auctions (Q2571440) (← links)
- Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium (Q3460334) (← links)
- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium (Q3460797) (← links)
- Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations (Q3465578) (← links)
- Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions (Q5031010) (← links)