The following pages link to Steven R. Williams (Q189154):
Displaying 22 items.
- Auctions with a profit sharing contract (Q380925) (← links)
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a locally stable message process (Q759631) (← links)
- Implementing a generic smooth function (Q1071626) (← links)
- On the local convergence of economic mechanisms (Q1083009) (← links)
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (Q1092778) (← links)
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency (Q1120444) (← links)
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design (Q1266874) (← links)
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (Q1300686) (← links)
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation (Q1601994) (← links)
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
- Price discovery using a double auction (Q2078033) (← links)
- On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence (Q2343383) (← links)
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design (Q2373781) (← links)
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large (Q3468839) (← links)
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design (Q3703689) (← links)
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information (Q4316533) (← links)
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction (Q4713298) (← links)
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism (Q5475010) (← links)
- Communication in Mechanism Design (Q5891791) (← links)
- Communication in Mechanism Design (Q5900497) (← links)
- Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply (Q5937321) (← links)
- Trade of a common value good (Q6086121) (← links)
