Pages that link to "Item:Q1915704"

The following pages link to The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality (Q1915704):

Displaying 21 items.

• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties (Q361808) (← links)
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players (Q405707) (← links)
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games (Q523503) (← links)
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium (Q524981) (← links)
• Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion (Q712470) (← links)
• Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (Q725060) (← links)
• Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence (Q823846) (← links)
• A model of minimal probabilistic belief revision (Q1036100) (← links)
• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall (Q1366492) (← links)
• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games (Q1864819) (← links)
• On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets (Q2175359) (← links)
• Backward induction in games without perfect recall (Q2212749) (← links)
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion (Q2325158) (← links)
• Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? (Q2357807) (← links)
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality (Q2437178) (← links)
• Bayesian and consistent assessments (Q2447155) (← links)
• Selling options (Q2455665) (← links)
• Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency (Q2464019) (← links)
• Operant Matching as a Nash Equilibrium of an Intertemporal Game (Q3399357) (← links)
• Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment (Q5126629) (← links)
• Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games (Q6188266) (← links)