Pages that link to "Item:Q2013446"

The following pages link to Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games (Q2013446):

Displaying 19 items.

• Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs (Q827746) (← links)
• Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays (Q831068) (← links)
• Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games (Q1714307) (← links)
• Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: the owner-intruder game (Q1716832) (← links)
• Adult sex ratio as an index for male strategy in primates (Q1734686) (← links)
• The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints (Q1750658) (← links)
• The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q1999485) (← links)
• Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state (Q2041291) (← links)
• Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory (Q2106062) (← links)
• The asymmetric hawk-dove game with costs measured as time lost (Q2159009) (← links)
• Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent? (Q2173878) (← links)
• When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: a model of kleptoparasitism (Q2217679) (← links)
• Reducing courtship time promotes marital bliss: the battle of the sexes game revisited with costs measured as time lost (Q2217714) (← links)
• The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics (Q2299264) (← links)
• Revisiting the ``fallacy of averages'' in ecology: expected gain per unit time equals expected gain divided by expected time (Q2328294) (← links)
• A temporal model of territorial defence with antagonistic interactions (Q2661455) (← links)
• Age structure, replicator equation, and the prisoner's dilemma (Q6063825) (← links)
• Evolution of aggression in consumer-resource models (Q6124779) (← links)
• Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection (Q6124782) (← links)