The following pages link to Antonio Romero-Medina (Q224494):
Displaying 19 items.
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
- Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets (Q816105) (← links)
- Coalition formation and stability (Q862533) (← links)
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120) (← links)
- Stability in coalition formation games (Q1414368) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
- Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations (Q1690647) (← links)
- Fair student placement (Q1706794) (← links)
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
- More on preference and freedom (Q2388795) (← links)
- On preference, freedom and diversity (Q2431834) (← links)
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2444196) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- ``Sex-equal'' stable matchings (Q5953205) (← links)
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence (Q6077637) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- A fair procedure in a marriage market (Q6641268) (← links)
