The following pages link to George J. Mailath (Q226704):
Displaying 22 items.
- Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications (Q405529) (← links)
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring (Q625045) (← links)
- The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example (Q809850) (← links)
- Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? (Q928877) (← links)
- On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval (Q1110466) (← links)
- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria (Q1113813) (← links)
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders (Q1198182) (← links)
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory (Q1201137) (← links)
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games (Q1308805) (← links)
- Normal form structures in extensive form games (Q1342409) (← links)
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies. (Q1347820) (← links)
- How proper is sequential equilibrium? (Q1357403) (← links)
- Correlated equilibria and local interactions (Q1367715) (← links)
- Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions (Q1804020) (← links)
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. (Q1864811) (← links)
- Common learning with intertemporal dependence (Q1939514) (← links)
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (Q2373776) (← links)
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria (Q2577445) (← links)
- BUYING LOCALLY (Q2956890) (← links)
- Market Selection and Asymmetric Information (Q3044083) (← links)
- WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME (Q5350496) (← links)
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (Q5473017) (← links)
