Pages that link to "Item:Q2347785"

The following pages link to Revenue maximization with a single sample (Q2347785):

Displaying 35 items.

• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (Q715242) (← links)
• On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions (Q777967) (← links)
• Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing (Q2078048) (← links)
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion (Q2100634) (← links)
• Selling two identical objects (Q2123177) (← links)
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (Q2173111) (← links)
• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions (Q2190389) (← links)
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders (Q2210509) (← links)
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition (Q2425155) (← links)
• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors (Q2516251) (← links)
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (Q2667262) (← links)
• Bayesian auctions with efficient queries (Q2667811) (← links)
• Diffusion auction design (Q2667812) (← links)
• Constant competitive algorithms for unbounded one-way trading under monotone hazard rate (Q2668551) (← links)
• Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming (Q2670901) (← links)
• Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions (Q2937777) (← links)
• A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders (Q2959828) (← links)
• Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue (Q2959830) (← links)
• Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading (Q2959847) (← links)
• Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition (Q3387955) (← links)
• Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities (Q3452806) (← links)
• Applications of $$\alpha $$-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions (Q3460792) (← links)
• The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling (Q3460800) (← links)
• Making the Most of Your Samples (Q4641589) (← links)
• Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis (Q4978196) (← links)
• Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions (Q4994171) (← links)
• Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms (Q5031662) (← links)
• Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint (Q5058041) (← links)
• Pricing with Samples (Q5080664) (← links)
• Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach (Q5247609) (← links)
• (Q5381115) (← links)
• (Q5743445) (← links)
• Learning in Repeated Auctions (Q5863991) (← links)
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents (Q6062957) (← links)
• Price discrimination with robust beliefs (Q6106503) (← links)