Pages that link to "Item:Q2365784"
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The following pages link to Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (Q2365784):
Displayed 14 items.
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Q452827) (← links)
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies (Q705955) (← links)
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542) (← links)
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (Q996393) (← links)
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (Q997202) (← links)
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making (Q1848621) (← links)
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules (Q1959697) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)