Pages that link to "Item:Q2386331"

The following pages link to Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods (Q2386331):

Displaying 50 items.

• House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly (Q277304) (← links)
• Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions (Q281343) (← links)
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems (Q308625) (← links)
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets (Q498757) (← links)
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange (Q523519) (← links)
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q639889) (← links)
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents (Q682470) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation (Q697840) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects (Q722621) (← links)
• Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
• Pairwise kidney exchange (Q813943) (← links)
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations (Q836935) (← links)
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain (Q860356) (← links)
• Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods (Q869861) (← links)
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets (Q898664) (← links)
• Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules (Q898752) (← links)
• Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness (Q926330) (← links)
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization (Q980969) (← links)
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments (Q980972) (← links)
• Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes (Q1005762) (← links)
• Random assignment under weak preferences (Q1021614) (← links)
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness (Q1028549) (← links)
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. (Q1411037) (← links)
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. (Q1415914) (← links)
• Consistency in house allocation problems (Q1576474) (← links)
• Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders (Q1651735) (← links)
• A complete characterization of hierarchy (Q1667900) (← links)
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
• Matching with single-peaked preferences (Q1729666) (← links)
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism (Q1785480) (← links)
• Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences (Q1786741) (← links)
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775) (← links)
• Hierarchical allocation (Q1929081) (← links)
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent (Q1934066) (← links)
• Assigning papers to referees (Q1959732) (← links)
• Random assignments of bundles (Q1985726) (← links)
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects (Q2058845) (← links)
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (Q2078029) (← links)
• Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects (Q2078057) (← links)
• Strategy-proof popular mechanisms (Q2092775) (← links)
• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler (Q2100102) (← links)
• Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)