The following pages link to Daniel Krähmer (Q281405):
Displayed 15 items.
- Optimal sequential delegation (Q281407) (← links)
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information (Q449184) (← links)
- Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (Q643288) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints (Q1668225) (← links)
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result (Q1682735) (← links)
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities (Q1929830) (← links)
- When are signals complements or substitutes? (Q1943444) (← links)
- Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion (Q1949210) (← links)
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design (Q2173101) (← links)
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening (Q2343401) (← links)
- Equilibrium learning in simple contests (Q2371153) (← links)
- Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening (Q3398230) (← links)
- Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights (Q4610729) (← links)
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning (Q5198892) (← links)