Pages that link to "Item:Q3006638"
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The following pages link to Robust stability in matching markets (Q3006638):
Displaying 17 items.
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? (Q459157) (← links)
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) (← links)
- Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Complexity study for the robust stable marriage problem (Q2419115) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
