The following pages link to Hans Gersbach (Q311032):
Displaying 50 items.
- Global refunding and climate change (Q311034) (← links)
- Basic research, openness, and convergence (Q356748) (← links)
- Preferences for harmony and minority voting (Q419402) (← links)
- Information acquisition and transparency in committees (Q422363) (← links)
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour (Q505276) (← links)
- Club theory and household formation (Q617578) (← links)
- Bargaining cum voice (Q622575) (← links)
- Groups, collective decisions and markets (Q629334) (← links)
- On the limits of democracy (Q647552) (← links)
- Raising juveniles (Q665077) (← links)
- Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation (Q712479) (← links)
- Power to youth: designing democracy for long-term well-being (Q732920) (← links)
- Information sharing in democratic mechanisms (Q776856) (← links)
- Imperfect competition, general equilibrium and unemployment (Q844653) (← links)
- The macroeconomics of Modigliani-Miller (Q894068) (← links)
- Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? (Q927415) (← links)
- Minority voting and long-term decisions (Q980960) (← links)
- Reelection threshold contracts in politics (Q1024768) (← links)
- Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption (Q1039573) (← links)
- Markets and regulatory hold-up problems (Q1288816) (← links)
- Risk and the value of information in irreversible decisions (Q1367743) (← links)
- Hierarchical growth: basic and applied research (Q1657345) (← links)
- Power at general equilibrium (Q1703361) (← links)
- Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies (Q1735794) (← links)
- Dividing resources by flexible majority rules (Q1762861) (← links)
- The money-burning refinement: with an application to a political signalling game (Q1764282) (← links)
- Why one person one vote? (Q1777359) (← links)
- When inefficiency begets efficiency (Q1780158) (← links)
- How to avoid the consequences of anticipated monetary policies (Q1817978) (← links)
- How to get firms to invest: a simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation. (Q1862640) (← links)
- Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate (Q1865165) (← links)
- Is capital a collusion device? (Q1865169) (← links)
- Information efficiency and majority decisions (Q1908526) (← links)
- A human relations paradox (Q1940718) (← links)
- Inflation forecast contracts (Q1991931) (← links)
- Growth and enduring epidemic diseases (Q1994142) (← links)
- Crisis contracts (Q1996121) (← links)
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting (Q2044979) (← links)
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism (Q2061099) (← links)
- Deposit insurance and reinsurance (Q2063054) (← links)
- Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers (Q2100625) (← links)
- Gainers and losers from market integration (Q2127893) (← links)
- Loanable funds versus money creation in banking: a benchmark result (Q2134164) (← links)
- A refunding scheme to incentivize narrow-spectrum antibiotic development (Q2141299) (← links)
- The impact of technologies in political campaigns (Q2164623) (← links)
- On efficient firm formation (Q2203491) (← links)
- On the money creation approach to banking (Q2240677) (← links)
- Balanced voting (Q2243534) (← links)
- Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching? (Q2246582) (← links)
- The value of public information in majority decisions (Q2277346) (← links)
