The following pages link to Fuhito Kojima (Q337799):
Displaying 36 items.
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action (Q423742) (← links)
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257) (← links)
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
- A theory of hung juries and informative voting (Q980975) (← links)
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects (Q1005770) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis (Q1757595) (← links)
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
- The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models (Q2435899) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration (Q2482665) (← links)
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games (Q2496235) (← links)
- Robust stability in matching markets (Q3006638) (← links)
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (Q3057835) (← links)
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931) (← links)
- ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY (Q3502854) (← links)
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (Q3564693) (← links)
- The “rural hospital theorem” revisited (Q4583374) (← links)
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition (Q4682746) (← links)
- Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency (Q4682795) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
- ``Near'' weighted utilitarian characterizations of Pareto optima (Q6536799) (← links)
- Job matching with subsidy and taxation (Q6638712) (← links)
- Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications (Q6638740) (← links)
- A Note on Ordinally Concave Functions (Q6734360) (← links)
