Pages that link to "Item:Q3392068"
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The following pages link to Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical (Q3392068):
Displaying 29 items.
- Revenue deficiency under second-price auctions in a supply-chain setting (Q297202) (← links)
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods (Q324135) (← links)
- A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals (Q342157) (← links)
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (Q406416) (← links)
- Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213) (← links)
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions (Q976430) (← links)
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (Q993785) (← links)
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets (Q1668196) (← links)
- An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement (Q1714944) (← links)
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains (Q1735779) (← links)
- Incentive compatible regression learning (Q1959425) (← links)
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games (Q2019359) (← links)
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers (Q2031178) (← links)
- An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets (Q2172096) (← links)
- A combinatorial double auction resource allocation model in cloud computing (Q2279671) (← links)
- Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment (Q2345231) (← links)
- Auctions in which losers set the price (Q2389310) (← links)
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game (Q2415999) (← links)
- A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games (Q2942465) (← links)
- Efficiency and Budget Balance (Q2959843) (← links)
- Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion (Q3195236) (← links)
- Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition (Q3387955) (← links)
- “Now or Later?” When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing (Q5031655) (← links)
- An iterative combinatorial auction design for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles (Q6071126) (← links)
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation (Q6074842) (← links)
- Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives (Q6100445) (← links)
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids (Q6640585) (← links)
