Pages that link to "Item:Q3468841"

The following pages link to Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism (Q3468841):

Displaying 20 items.

• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms (Q673297) (← links)
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension (Q749420) (← links)
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods (Q809860) (← links)
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations (Q999738) (← links)
• Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer (Q1021613) (← links)
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism (Q1207011) (← links)
• On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria (Q1340080) (← links)
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types (Q1371183) (← links)
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. (Q1415908) (← links)
• Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations (Q1590140) (← links)
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships (Q1592728) (← links)
• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information (Q1669100) (← links)
• A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: efficiency and implementation (Q2126153) (← links)
• Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy (Q2159807) (← links)
• Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale (Q2268909) (← links)
• Divide-and-permute (Q2387317) (← links)
• Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results (Q2452247) (← links)
• Implementation in production economies with increasing returns (Q2486164) (← links)
• REPUTATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS (Q2920156) (← links)
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation (Q6168259) (← links)