The following pages link to (Q3624050):
Displaying 25 items.
- A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality (Q343234) (← links)
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control (Q385502) (← links)
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions (Q465694) (← links)
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates (Q490458) (← links)
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting (Q616771) (← links)
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control (Q627120) (← links)
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation? (Q656822) (← links)
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners (Q835761) (← links)
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem (Q835815) (← links)
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets (Q837194) (← links)
- The learnability of voting rules (Q840821) (← links)
- Dichotomy for voting systems (Q859982) (← links)
- On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information (Q901143) (← links)
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems (Q1040585) (← links)
- Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences (Q1637215) (← links)
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying (Q1662102) (← links)
- The opacity of backbones (Q2051797) (← links)
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis (Q2256717) (← links)
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis (Q2256718) (← links)
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation (Q2426957) (← links)
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey (Q2436695) (← links)
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control (Q3392307) (← links)
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control (Q3392309) (← links)
- Voting Procedures, Complexity of (Q5150301) (← links)
- Collective decision making (Q6602233) (← links)
