The following pages link to (Q3624066):
Displaying 49 items.
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy (Q420791) (← links)
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions (Q460636) (← links)
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting (Q616771) (← links)
- The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms (Q825192) (← links)
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks (Q861267) (← links)
- Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs (Q892907) (← links)
- Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities (Q899160) (← links)
- Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines (Q952439) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results (Q1001137) (← links)
- Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification (Q1006066) (← links)
- Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents (Q1041237) (← links)
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. (Q1401398) (← links)
- A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss (Q1634066) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs (Q1744245) (← links)
- Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions (Q1786603) (← links)
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing (Q1885423) (← links)
- Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations (Q1887929) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design for bin packing with applications on cloud computing (Q2084605) (← links)
- How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium (Q2140279) (← links)
- Eliciting social knowledge for creditworthiness assessment (Q2152138) (← links)
- Computer science and decision theory (Q2271874) (← links)
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints (Q2318114) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach (Q2345944) (← links)
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities (Q2346934) (← links)
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings (Q2351253) (← links)
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (Q2454572) (← links)
- Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints (Q2481947) (← links)
- Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale (Q2503057) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable (Q2512655) (← links)
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings (Q2516250) (← links)
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (Q2519488) (← links)
- On the approximability of the range assignment problem on radio networks in presence of selfish agents (Q2570125) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business (Q2571439) (← links)
- Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects (Q2830053) (← links)
- Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q2867515) (← links)
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling (Q3460800) (← links)
- Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms (Q3601792) (← links)
- Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions (Q5031009) (← links)
- Stability and Recovery for Independence Systems (Q5111712) (← links)
- Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling (Q5135252) (← links)
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case (Q5283446) (← links)
- Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks (Q5459979) (← links)
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q5891528) (← links)
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions (Q5900469) (← links)
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions (Q5952450) (← links)
- Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives (Q6100445) (← links)
