Pages that link to "Item:Q3627285"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (Q3627285):
Displayed 30 items.
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces (Q406380) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers (Q516980) (← links)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences (Q893399) (← links)
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms (Q1622453) (← links)
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings (Q1672900) (← links)
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains (Q1735779) (← links)
- On the fastest Vickrey algorithm (Q1957643) (← links)
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem (Q2018936) (← links)
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms (Q2058863) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles (Q2074053) (← links)
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer (Q2212767) (← links)
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness (Q2218554) (← links)
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle (Q2268126) (← links)
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546) (← links)
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games (Q2280042) (← links)
- Implementability with contingent contracts (Q2300371) (← links)
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains (Q2334836) (← links)
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments (Q2353701) (← links)
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences (Q2358563) (← links)
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments (Q2397662) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941) (← links)
- First-best collusion without communication (Q2437177) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations (Q2450090) (← links)
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis (Q2667284) (← links)
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments (Q2937768) (← links)
- Efficiency and Budget Balance (Q2959843) (← links)
- Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions (Q5111112) (← links)
- Detecting profitable deviations (Q6121891) (← links)