Pages that link to "Item:Q3655345"

The following pages link to Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (Q3655345):

Displaying 50 items.

• Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs (Q290168) (← links)
• Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements (Q310932) (← links)
• Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty (Q485574) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (Q503060) (← links)
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence (Q516968) (← links)
• Honesty and informal agreements (Q523491) (← links)
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (Q533083) (← links)
• Strategic argumentation (Q634508) (← links)
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms (Q645640) (← links)
• Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness (Q719893) (← links)
• Information identification in different networks with heterogeneous information sources (Q741882) (← links)
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market (Q894069) (← links)
• Bare promises: an experiment (Q974225) (← links)
• Communication under language barriers (Q1729677) (← links)
• Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response (Q1735755) (← links)
• Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge (Q1735778) (← links)
• Receiver's dilemma (Q1745660) (← links)
• Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating (Q1753692) (← links)
• Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation (Q1792580) (← links)
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission (Q1939516) (← links)
• Creating confusion (Q1995296) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages (Q2025013) (← links)
• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions (Q2051504) (← links)
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent (Q2051507) (← links)
• Intention or request: the impact of message structures (Q2052492) (← links)
• When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance (Q2058874) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment (Q2074041) (← links)
• Communication-enhancing vagueness (Q2091705) (← links)
• When does centralization undermine adaptation? (Q2095261) (← links)
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
• Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest (Q2155880) (← links)
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs (Q2173104) (← links)
• Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation (Q2173410) (← links)
• Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly (Q2178023) (← links)
• Lying and reciprocity (Q2278920) (← links)
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes (Q2280048) (← links)
• Maximal miscommunication (Q2300368) (← links)
• Strategic communication with reporting costs (Q2329164) (← links)
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives (Q2402061) (← links)
• Optimal limited authority for principal (Q2434229) (← links)
• Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies (Q2437165) (← links)
• Honesty in tournaments (Q2453026) (← links)
• Persuasion with communication costs (Q2516228) (← links)
• De-biasing strategic communication (Q2667271) (← links)
• Monotone persuasion (Q2667277) (← links)
• A reputation for honesty (Q2675407) (← links)
• Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible (Q2682025) (← links)
• Communication with endogenous deception costs (Q2682785) (← links)
• Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences (Q2685839) (← links)
• Screening and Signaling in Communication* (Q3166550) (← links)