Pages that link to "Item:Q3743039"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design (Q3743039):
Displaying 47 items.
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Implementation with partial provability (Q449172) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions without money (Q521808) (← links)
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability (Q705843) (← links)
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games (Q705857) (← links)
- Verifiable disclosure (Q722620) (← links)
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts (Q753636) (← links)
- Hard evidence and mechanism design (Q864889) (← links)
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word (Q868605) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (Q899681) (← links)
- Revenue management by sequential screening (Q900601) (← links)
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (Q930006) (← links)
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont (Q1022388) (← links)
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
- Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission (Q1939516) (← links)
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information (Q2002347) (← links)
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification (Q2016253) (← links)
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages (Q2025013) (← links)
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries (Q2036920) (← links)
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations (Q2211471) (← links)
- Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection (Q2231414) (← links)
- Workup (Q2254234) (← links)
- Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling (Q2271101) (← links)
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes (Q2280048) (← links)
- Evidence reading mechanisms (Q2325665) (← links)
- Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments (Q2432489) (← links)
- Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints (Q2466858) (← links)
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns (Q2486164) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable (Q2512655) (← links)
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability (Q2519482) (← links)
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types (Q2581787) (← links)
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion (Q2627913) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mechanism for influential agent selection (Q2670910) (← links)
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES (Q3606357) (← links)
- Persuasion and dynamic communication (Q4585998) (← links)
- Implementation with evidence (Q4683689) (← links)
- Selling with evidence (Q5225078) (← links)
- Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize (Q5459984) (← links)
- Long information design (Q6059533) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification (Q6084797) (← links)
- Screening for experiments (Q6148361) (← links)
- Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games (Q6150676) (← links)
- Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games (Q6166480) (← links)
- Repeated communication with private lying costs (Q6166489) (← links)
