The following pages link to René Kirkegaard (Q380873):
Displayed 14 items.
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps (Q380874) (← links)
- Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach (Q523501) (← links)
- Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions (Q926888) (← links)
- Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers (Q1928714) (← links)
- Scale effects in multi-unit auctions (Q2002353) (← links)
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions (Q2050991) (← links)
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices (Q2078069) (← links)
- Asymmetric first price auctions (Q2271373) (← links)
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch (Q2442843) (← links)
- A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result (Q2494014) (← links)
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions (Q2859537) (← links)
- Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds (Q3398226) (← links)
- A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems (Q4682752) (← links)
- Endogenous criteria for success (Q6139980) (← links)