The following pages link to Daniel Diermeier (Q380887):
Displaying 15 items.
- Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter (Q380889) (← links)
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy (Q412094) (← links)
- Bargaining over the budget (Q537546) (← links)
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies (Q1590051) (← links)
- Electoral institutions with impressionable voters (Q2093833) (← links)
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures (Q2361514) (← links)
- Coordination and turnout in large elections (Q2389782) (← links)
- Voting with your pocketbook - a stochastic model of consumer boycotts (Q2389783) (← links)
- Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems (Q2765519) (← links)
- Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration (Q3088333) (← links)
- Political Economy of Redistribution (Q4614960) (← links)
- Executive Control and Legislative Success (Q5198888) (← links)
- Efficient system-wide coordination in noisy environments (Q5460737) (← links)
- A Structural Model of Government Formation (Q5476207) (← links)
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining (Q5486928) (← links)
