Pages that link to "Item:Q3812075"

The following pages link to Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (Q3812075):

Displaying 50 items.

• Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning (Q263391) (← links)
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations (Q290174) (← links)
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions (Q324169) (← links)
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders (Q337790) (← links)
• Information concentration in common value environments (Q370959) (← links)
• Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations (Q413512) (← links)
• Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction (Q513288) (← links)
• Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
• On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types (Q529764) (← links)
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (Q617676) (← links)
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents (Q617679) (← links)
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (Q633787) (← links)
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892) (← links)
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (Q643288) (← links)
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
• Locally robust implementation and its limits (Q694745) (← links)
• Informal communication (Q707291) (← links)
• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (Q715242) (← links)
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation (Q777726) (← links)
• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (Q839608) (← links)
• The communication cost of selfishness (Q840676) (← links)
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (Q840688) (← links)
• The value of information for auctioneers (Q840693) (← links)
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction (Q878397) (← links)
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (Q938057) (← links)
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382) (← links)
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values (Q996390) (← links)
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (Q1001814) (← links)
• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information (Q1099054) (← links)
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction (Q1181222) (← links)
• Continuity in auction design (Q1181229) (← links)
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules (Q1190249) (← links)
• Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types (Q1268573) (← links)
• Pollution claim settlements under correlated information (Q1268595) (← links)
• The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions (Q1270757) (← links)
• Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility (Q1278231) (← links)
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments (Q1300508) (← links)
• Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (Q1338090) (← links)
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction (Q1363369) (← links)
• Coordination and externalities (Q1381964) (← links)
• The effectiveness of English auctions. (Q1399514) (← links)
• Asymmetric English auctions. (Q1414615) (← links)
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. (Q1416504) (← links)
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. (Q1431786) (← links)
• The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (Q1616494) (← links)
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation (Q1622381) (← links)
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms (Q1622453) (← links)