The following pages link to (Q3853475):
Displayed 10 items.
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system (Q814831) (← links)
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (Q913628) (← links)
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard (Q1054250) (← links)
- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting (Q1090219) (← links)
- A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games (Q1112746) (← links)
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency (Q1268636) (← links)
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency (Q1341508) (← links)
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games (Q1906023) (← links)
- Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information (Q2272175) (← links)
- Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing (Q2642565) (← links)