The following pages link to Incentives in Teams (Q4070951):
Displaying 50 items.
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights (Q277315) (← links)
- Mechanism design and intentions (Q281379) (← links)
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities (Q283181) (← links)
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations (Q290174) (← links)
- Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem (Q296745) (← links)
- Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies (Q301872) (← links)
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
- A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals (Q342157) (← links)
- Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks (Q391236) (← links)
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds (Q392663) (← links)
- Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities (Q414842) (← links)
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness (Q417640) (← links)
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach (Q417702) (← links)
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (Q427512) (← links)
- Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions (Q431926) (← links)
- Asymmetric partnerships (Q433189) (← links)
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets (Q433728) (← links)
- Some results of Christos Papadimitriou on internet structure, network routing, and web information (Q458485) (← links)
- Strategic bidding behaviors in nondecreasing sponsored search auctions (Q460277) (← links)
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions (Q460636) (← links)
- Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms (Q476890) (← links)
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem (Q477794) (← links)
- (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests (Q483551) (← links)
- Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line (Q489723) (← links)
- Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows (Q490193) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations (Q497945) (← links)
- Prediction and welfare in ad auctions (Q506530) (← links)
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good (Q516975) (← links)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
- One man, one bid (Q523013) (← links)
- Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms (Q523018) (← links)
- Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses (Q523020) (← links)
- Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance (Q523029) (← links)
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem (Q523512) (← links)
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (Q532676) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing (Q532731) (← links)
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models (Q536097) (← links)
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems (Q543619) (← links)
- On robustness of forward-looking in sponsored search auction (Q603916) (← links)
- Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games (Q604756) (← links)
- Scheduling with package auctions (Q606079) (← links)
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share (Q607262) (← links)
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting (Q616771) (← links)
- Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness (Q627119) (← links)
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers (Q631122) (← links)
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines (Q635328) (← links)